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ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD.

Reviewed by Susan H. Rockford*
Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood is devoted to a
portrayal of the motivations underlying the current abortion debate as it ensues between pro-choice and pro-life activist
women.' As refined and characterized by Luker, the issue of
abortion in this context is really "a referendum on the place and
meaning of motherhood" 2 and the participants are the women
who perceive their lifestyles threatened in fact or in theory by
the outcome of the debate.
According to Luker, pro-life and pro-choice women are recognizable and distinguishable by what she describes as their respective "world views," each being an "internally coherent and
mutually shared view of the world that is tacit, never fully articulated, and, most importantly, completely at odds with the
world view held by their opponents." Briefly, the "world view"
of a pro-life activist woman is articulated as morally straightforward and unambiguous, incorporating the belief that men and
women are intrinsically different and have different roles to
play. Central to this "world view" is a sort of faith and accept*

The author is an attorney practicing in New York. She has practiced and written

in the field of health care .law.
1. The book is based on a study done by Luker. An activist is defined as an individual who spends ten hours or more a week in activity on the abortion issue if pro-life and
five hours a week or more if pro-choice. As Luker, an associate professor of sociology at
the University of California at San Diego, admits, this study is technically only a study
of very deeply committed activists in the abortion debate in California; however, she
extrapolates that it is probably a reasonably accurate picture of how abortion activists
think and feel throughout the United States, as well as a picture of the background that
made them feel the way they do.
2. K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 193 (1984).
3. Id. at 159.
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ance of (or resignation to) an external natural order of things
over which one does not exercise much control. An intrinsic part
of this "natural order" is the role of motherhood.
Pro-choice activist women, on the other hand, are characterized as believing in the ability to control one's fate, at least to
some degree, by making rational choices about life decisions, including both motherhood and careers. As Luker describes it,
moral judgment for pro-choice women consists of "weighing a
number of competing situations and rights and trying to reconcile them under general principles rather than specific moral
rules." 4
As an attorney and mother, born and raised in a Catholic,
middle-class community in Queens, New York, I have had personal experience with both "world views." Thus, the emotional
and psychological content of the abortion debate as described by
Luker rings true. Like many women, I have the questionable
privilege of being able to relate to both sides of the controversy;
I wonder, however, how much of this dual identification is simply due to the fact that the external debate described by Luker
reflects the internal ambiguity experienced by so many women,
both pro-life and pro-choice, on this issue.
The most interesting aspect of this book is the depiction of
the gut level on which the issue is felt by the women activists on
both sides of the issue. Each party has, at least on some level, its
survival at stake. It is each side's defense of its essence, its selfdefinition, that lends the debate its intense emotional quality; it
is the politics of survival. While at times the positions expressed
seem somewhat hyperbolic and even simplistic, which may be
the logical result of this particular study sample, the moral complexity of the issue lies just below the surface.
For example, a pro-life woman is sure that an embryo at
any state of development is a "person" but is not sure what she
would do if impregnated by rape; a pro-choice woman believes
that each woman should have freedom of choice but cannot condone abortion either as a deliberate method of birth control or
in multiple cases of "negligence." Luker's book suggests that, regardless of the rhetoric, women on both sides of the debate know
in their hearts that there is no absolute answer to this issue.
4.

Id. at 184.
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A frightening prospect continued to haunt me throughout
my reading of this book-that while this intra-gender warfare
rages, those not involved in the emotional debate, i.e., those who
have no personal stake in the issue with regard to either status
or sexuality, are able to use the issue strictly in the name of
power. The abortion issue, as it is currently being used offensively in the political forum by those in positions of power, is
unfortunately often merely an agenda item and its effects on the
role of women in society will, therefore, be merely incidental.
Some of the historical observations made by Luker are interesting, but open to question. In essence, the book seems to
attribute the vigor of the current pro-life and pro-choice movements to the "coming-out," as it were, of formerly private (or
secret) attitudes and practices with regard to abortion. Two of
the events described as central to this change were the Sherri
Finkbine abortion case5 and the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.6
According to Luker, prior to these events the abortion issue
was debated and handled primarily by an elite professional
group consisting of physicians who manipulated the issue for political and professional goals. At some point, other professionals
joined the debate, but it continued to be handled "professionally." Once the issue "went public," however, via Finkbine and
Roe, Luker hypothesizes that pro-life women realized that, in
fact, abortion was more widespread and performed under a
much more liberal standard than had been assumed (or, perhaps, not thought about at all). Indeed, Roe seemed to grant legal status to abortion on demand. Pro-choice women, on the
other hand, realized how much power was being wielded by the
medical establishment. These revelations and the resulting redefinition by pro-choice women of abortion as a women's rights
issue, instead of as a professional or medical issue, sparked the
5. Briefly, in 1962 Sherri Finkbine discovered that the drug she had been taking to
help her sleep during the early months of her pregnancy was Thalidomide, a drug which
her husband picked up in Europe. On learning of the documented disastrous effects on
fetuses of this drug, Finkbine sought an abortion. According to Luker, all went well until
Finkbine, in the interests of alerting other women, reported her problem to the local
newspaper before the abortion was performed. News of the planned abortion created a
great stir and Finkbine was ultimately forced to have her abortion in Sweden. Luker,
supra note 2, at 62-65.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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current debate among activists. Whether one agrees with this
particular historical scenario or not, Luker's book is about the
emergence of abortion as a human rights issue.
There is irony in Luker's observation that the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade provided a
spark for the current pro-life movement, indeed, shocked it into
motion. Roe v. Wade, although it was heralded as a breakthrough in women's rights that gave women the "right" to an
abortion, is outdated and on the brink of technological extinction. Even at the time of the decision, in 1973, it was a decision,
which, apropos of Luker's historical framework, gave the abortion decision squarely to physicians. It placed the balance between women's rights and the state's interest in a fetus (for
clearly, under the Court's analysis, states could take an interest
in fetuses, even if they were not "persons") on a continuum
measured by technological progress. As long as abortion was
safer than childbirth, first trimester abortion was allowable unless, of course, the fetus was "viable." Viability was absolutely
defined by technology: the potential ability to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. 7 And, even though set
at three months at the time of the decision in 1973, viability was
clearly intended to be a changing concept.
As must have been foreseen by the Court, as technology improves, abortion becomes safer and fetuses become viable earlier, until, as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently observed,
the issue becomes a standoff, with the woman and the fetus
squared off, having, under the Roe analysis, equal legal status.9
Analytically, rather than symbolically, Roe is not necessarily a
strong women's rights decision and is currently so vulnerable
that it has perhaps become a liability to the pro-choice
movement."1
7. 410 U.S. at 160. While the articulation of the viability standard has changed somewhat in subsequent cases, the underlying technological concept seems to be the same.
8. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983).
9. Commentators have explored this problem. See, e.g., King, The JuridicalStatus
of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647
(1979); Note, Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence,27
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1221 (1982).
10. Roe has been the subject of much analysis and criticism of its underlying jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82

1984]

BOOK REVIEWS

Luker's projections for the future of the abortion controversy are sad indeed. She tentatively suggests that the abortion
issue will run cyclically and, at least for a time, may become like
Prohibition: nominally illegal, but available for those with the
right money and right information. I hope she is wrong, but fear
she may be right. Resolving abortion as a Prohibition-like,
purely political issue is simply a return to the worst aspects of
the 1950's and speaks ill of a society that is truly interested in
having its morality taken seriously.

YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES. 2 Vols. Edited by Theodor Meron. Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1984. Pp. 566. $79.90.
Reviewed by Daniel C. Turack*
With very little reflection, academics can think of many cogent reasons for teaching a course on international human
rights, yet the subject has not entered the mainstream of university education. One reason for the subject's absence from the
standard university curriculum has been the paucity of teaching
materials and teaching tools such as casebooks and textbooks.
Of late, these shortcomings have been remedied 1 and Professor
Meron has admirably added to the sources available.
This book is comprised of thirteen chapters, each contributed by a different international lawyer specializing in the
human rights field; it is organized into three distinct parts: "The
Setting" (I), "Global Protection of Human Rights" (II), and
"Regional Protection of Human Rights" (III). With the exception of the first chapter, which is more than an overview on the
teaching of human rights, the format for each of the succeeding
chapters shows the legal and policy considerations of the particular topic that forms the core of the book, teaching suggestions,
a brief syllabus, a mini-syllabus, a bibliography and a mini-bibliography. Easily, the best review of the book's contents is to
reproduce Professor Meron's introductory chapter. Aside from
his summary, comments on each author's contribution, and purposes behind the book, the editor makes us aware of the status
of human rights, the conflicts that exist with implementation
and political realities, and possible pedagogical tactics that can
*
Professor of Law, Capital University School of Law.
1. The teaching of human rights has received an enormous boost from the availability
of the following: R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY (1979); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980); L. HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1981); K. VASAK, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (P. Alston ed. 1982); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d

ed. 1982); T.

FRANCK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1983).

(1982); P.

SIEGHART,
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be employed in teaching the subject. He makes us aware that
this work does not embody the entire corpus juris of international human rights.
The second chapter, by Professor Louis Henkin, provides a
comparative philosophical study of American constitutional and
other rights with those in the international system. It is not a
structured comparative study in fine detail. Rather, it compares
United States and international human rights in spirit and jurisprudential perspective. He believes that to understand the international law of human rights, one must comprehend their relation to rights in a national system. Consequently, Henkin traces
different notions of the concepts of rights and their place in
United States national political theory, as well as the role of judicial review. Based upon the method adopted in this study, it is
suggested that one might teach national and international
human rights as comparative constitutional law.
The third and concluding chapter of this part, by Jerome J.
Shestack, offers a theoretical framework for human rights. He
examines the philosophical underpinnings of these rights and
looks into the norm-making process creating them. He provides
insight into the nature of human rights, their sources, and various approaches to the subject. In sum, his purpose is to introduce human rights and alert the reader to some of the principal
issues in the area, with the hope of encouraging further intellectual exploration. His teaching suggestion is to raise philosophic
issues throughout the course.
Part II, "Global Protection of Human Rights," commences
with Professor Richard B. Lillich's investigation of civil rights
following the pattern of articles 3-18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its companion counterparts in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He does
not create a comprehensive map of all civil rights, but rather
emphasizes those rights which cannot be derogated under the
Covenant. His approach is analytical rather than historical, and
he stresses process over substance in his teaching suggestions. In
chapter five, Professor John P. Humphrey stresses in historical
context the development of political rights first enunciated in
articles 18-21 of the Universal Declaration and their counterparts in The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. These are the freedoms of thought, conscience and reli-
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gion, of peaceful assembly and association, of participation in
the government of one's country, of equal access to public service, and the right of all peoples to self-determination. He looks
at two approaches to teaching the subject: the "historical-structural" (dynamic) method and the "analytical-exegetical" (static)
method, and outlines the pros and cons of each approach.
Professor David M. Trubek writes on the meaning, nature
and protection of economic, social and cultural rights, which he
treats collectively as "social welfare rights," in a Third World
context. He delves into the effect of political and social vitality
in shaping law, and the role of law in shaping political and social
circumstances. His focus is also on the behavior of United Nations Specialized Agencies in the overall implementation system
of these rights. He considers a process-oriented approach most
beneficial in teaching the subject.
Francis Wolf, Legal Adviser in the International Labour Organization, (I.L.O.), uses his expertise with the activities of that
body to analyze the functioning of national and international
machinery for supervising the application of I.L.O. conventions.
He concentrates on the various I.L.O. contentious and noncontentious procedures for investigating alleged violations and
complaints.
Jack Greenberg brings the perspective of an American civil
rights practitioner to the topic of "Race, Sex and Religious Discrimination in International Law," in chapter eight. His exposition highlights international instruments dealing with affirmative action, and provides an interesting insight as to how certain
United States cases could have been resolved under relevant international instruments, -rather than under statutes or the
United States Constitution. He advocates the use of the case
method as a means of teaching the subject. In a short ninth
chapter, Professor Yoram Dinstein conveys the essence of
human rights in armed conflict. Moreover, he outlines the interplay of human rights during peacetime and wartime, as well as
the problems of enforceability and supervision. With respect to
teaching this aspect of the subject, he finds it preferable to incorporate specific problems into the course relating to actual
armed conflicts occurring at the time of teaching.
Professor Louis B. Sohn presents a survey of the progress
and mechanisms for implementation and supervision of human
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rights in the United Nations context. Some developments are
still in inchoate form, such as resort to the good offices of the
Secretary-General, fact-finding groups and use of independent
experts. He is optimistic about the many constructive steps that
the United Nations has at its disposal to promote and protect
human rights. The contribution of various non-governmental organizations to the human rights cause is the subject of Professor
David Weissbrodt's twelfth chapter. He describes the work techniques of non-governmental organizations and encourages students to become involved in their activities. Teaching suggestions include problems suitable for class discussion and roleplaying.
Part III contains the final two chapters on regional protection of human rights. The two distinct legal sources comprising
the inter-American system are discussed by Judge Thomas
Buergenthal. He describes the manner in which the regimes
under the American Convention on Human Rights and the
Charter of the Organization of American States evolved, their
practice, and how they interact. The role of country studies, onsite inspections and individual communications is emphasized.
Judge Buergenthal suggests that it would be best to teach students about this regional system by discussing and comparing it
with the European system.
Professor Rosalyn Higgins contributes the final chapter,
which deals with the system developed under the European
Convention on Human Rights. She begins with a brief discussion
of the conceptual issues, to show where human rights jurisprudence is rooted, then moves into the Convention's implementation machinery and its operation. The final component for understanding the European Convention in action is seen in her
detailed discussion of case studies on some specific rights, such
as freedom from torture. She believes that the case method
could be best used to teach the subject.
While the legal and political considerations do not purport
to offer an exhaustive analysis of any of the topics, they do reflect an extensive and diverse range of legal, political, and social
issues. The teaching suggestions offer a broad spectrum of approaches. The substantive scope of each chapter is not mutually
exclusive with the rest. Authors make cross-references and allude to the considerations of other authors in this work. Profes-
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sor Lillich, for example, in his discussion of Civil Rights under
the International Covenant, consistently refers to the American
and European Conventions. Mini-syllabi and mini-reading lists
are included along with their expanded counterparts for teachers
who cannot devote an entire course or seminar to human rights
in general or to a given area. The mini-bibliography is not always a shorter version of references contained in the bibliography, as shown in Professor Humphrey's chapter.
The structure, content and diversity of teaching suggestions
demonstrates that the book is particularly well-suited for teaching human rights to students at least on the graduate and law
school levels. It could be used, with more introductory materials,
at the undergraduate level. Professor Meron and his co-authors
have gone the extra distance to help in the cross-fertilization between law and the other social sciences.

THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE

By Shirley Wohl Kram & Neil A. Frank. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. xvi, 176. $21.00.

LAW.

Reviewed by the Honorable Rose McBrien*
The practice of domestic relations law is both difficult and
painful-difficult in that the body of law is complex and unpredictable, and painful in that the client is emotionally involved
and does not understand the difficulties. The area of child custody is perhaps the most frustrating to the practitioner and to
the client alike.
How does the practitioner explain the obscurities of the
child custody law to a parent intent on getting his or her children at any cost? "It is undisputed that 'the best interest of the
children' must govern in the adjudication of custody" in the
State of New York.1 The law also tells us that in all cases there
shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either
parent.2 "The only absolute in the law governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes."' Considering this body of
law, it can be argued that such guidance appears to be no guidance at all. Each party believes that the custodial relationship in
the best interests of the child would include that party as the
custodial parent. This is usually the basis of the custody battle.
In order to counsel a litigant and prepare for trial, an attorney
must explore the myriad factors which a court may consider and
the weight that will be given each one. This book, with its detailed historical overview of child custody, is a valuable aid to
attorneys in custody litigation.
The authors of this thoughtfully presented dissertation aim
to present a "comprehensive analysis of the conceptual evolution
of judicial and legislative policy toward the resolution of disputed child-custody proceedings." '4 The value of this work is in
*

Acting Supreme Court Justice, New York State Supreme Court.

1. Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 372 N.E.2d 4, 5, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (1977).
2. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW section 240 (McKinney 1983).
3. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d

893, 895 (1982).
4.

S.

& N. FRANK,
at xiv (1982).
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its treatment of historical development in setting the tone for
current judicial thought in child-custody disputes. Through historical perspective certain predictabilities can be derived. The
authors use the law of New York State to demonstrate the development of the law of child custody; other jurisdictions are
compared and contrasted in order that valid conclusions may be
drawn on a broad national scale.
This volume is directed to the substantive law in terms of
the relief that a court of law may award. A future volume will be
devoted to procedural and ancillary topics in this area of the
law. The work thus far completed covers three major categories
of substantive relief: "(1) custody, or choosing which contestant
will have the ultimate control and/or physical possession of the
minor child; (2) visitation, or the extent to which an adversary
party will obtain the company and limited control of a minor
child for a specified time; and (3) counsel fees, which concerns
the liability of the parties to the potentially crippling expense of
' '5
litigating the first two enumerated issues.
The authors begin with a brief discussion of subject matter
jurisdiction, averring that the substantive issues cannot be studied in a vacuum. Only the procedural knowledge necessary to
gain access to the courts is presented.
The authors then delve into the historical basis for the law
of child custody, beginning with the common law preference for
custody in the father. In an 1837 decision, People ex rel. Nickerson," the New York Supreme Court found a prima facie right in
the father to the custody of a child, citing an impressive list of
old English decisions as authority. It was felt that "the interference of the court with the relation of father and child, by withdrawing the latter from the natural affection, kindness and obligations of the former, is a delicate and strong measure; and the
power should never be exerted except for the most sound and
solid reasons."'
The Tender Years Doctrine, the rule of law that enshrined
the mother as the preferred parent in most custody disputes, developed slowly, originally as exceptions to the common law right
5. Id. at xv.
6. 19 Wend. 16 (1837).
7. Id. at 19.
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of custody in the father. During the late 1800's, although the
father's prima facie right to custody was still intact, courts became increasingly more liberal in finding reasons for awarding
custody to the mother. In the 1904 decision of People ex. rel.
Sinclair v. Sinclair," the court found that the "tender years" of
the children was reason enough to award custody to the mother.
The presumption in favor of the father eventually gave way
under the Tender Years Doctrine, which came to full maturity
in the case of Ullman v. Ullman.9 The court held that "[t]he
child at tender age is entitled to have such care, love and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can usually give."1 ° Up
to this point the father had enjoyed a natural right to his children unless the mother could persuade the court otherwise.
With this decision, the burden was reversed.
The succeeding sixty years, the authors tell us, found the
law presuming that the mother was better suited to care for
young children. The major exception to the rule was in cases of
flagrant adultery.
Only recently has the law recognized the demise of the presumptions that gave credence to the Tender Years Doctrine.
Women are no longer expected to stay home with their children.
It is often incumbent upon the wife to enter the work force in
order to better provide for the family. Likewise, it is widely recognized that a father may assume much of the responsibility in
the care and upbringing of his children. The days when a father
remained aloof with regard to such matters are gladly over.
Although there is no longer a prima facie right of custody in
either parent, old prejudices die slowly. The painstaking history
of the Tender Years Doctrine provided by the authors demonstrates to those new to the child custody field how far the rights
of fathers have had to come. The slowness with which the law
has evolved suggests that fathers still have some distance to
travel before prejudice and misapprehension about their role
disappears. Actual parity between fathers and mothers with respect to their right to custody may not occur for some time.
What does this historical perspective mean to the practi8. 91 A.D. 322, 86 N.Y.S. 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
9. 151 A.D. 419, 135 N.Y.S. 1080. (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
10. Id. at 424-25, 135 N.Y.S. at 1083.
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tioner counseling a client in a child-custody dispute? It seems
incumbent on the father that he show he is capable of caring for
and raising the children. In this enlightened age, as previously
mentioned, it is no longer unusual for the father to take an active role in these endeavors. Most courts would assume the
mother fit unless it is otherwise demonstrated. The threshold
question is whether both parents can adequately care for the
children. If both are fit, the court must explore other issues, including finances, living arrangements, "environment and psychological aspects. Therefore, the first order of business for the father is to prove himself capable of child care, thus clearing the
Tender Years Doctrine hurdle. Then he must establish his superiority in terms of other considerations. For her part, the mother
must show her superior ability to care for the children, or the
father's lack thereof. Then she must turn her attention to the
other factors.
The authors next consider the current standards for the determination of custodial disputes. Recognizing that all cases involve degrees of fitness, rather than declaring a parent fit or unfit, a broad spectrum of factors are discussed. Also of interest is
the treatment afforded the effect of illegitimacy on custodial disputes, the rights of third parties as against the natural parents,
and visitation.
Counsel fees, a subject of noteworthy importance in such
disputes, is dealt with thoughtfully and thoroughly at the conclusion of this work.
The authors have written an excellent study of the law of
child custody. The insight-provided through historical perspective should be helpful to any practitioner immersed in this difficult and painful area of the law.

